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Gissendanner: Tort Recovery for Defective Products Posing a Threat of Bodily Ha
TORT RECOVERY FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS POSING A THREAT OF BODILY
HARM: AN EXCEPTION TO THE ECONOMIC Loss RULE?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Though the economic loss rule helps courts determine whether principles of
contract or tort apply in a particular case, courts do not agree on the precise
boundary line between the two doctrinal areas. Courts generally agree there is no
recovery in tort for a disappointed user of a defective product but recovery is
allowed for a user who suffers injury-personal injury or injury to property other
than the product itself.' However, courts take three positions in cases when only
the product itself is injured. First, some courts categorically reject tort remedies in
those cases.2 Second, some courts hold "that a manufacturer's duty to make
nondefective products encompass[es] injury to the product itself, whether or not the
defect created an unreasonable risk of harm."3 Third, some courts "differentiate
between 'the disappointed users . .. and the endangered ones"' and permit
endangered users to sue in tort even when only the product itself is injured.4
Recently, in Colleton PreparatoryAcademy, Inc. v. Hoover Universal,Inc. ,s
the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, sitting in
diversity,6 rejected the third view" but later certified to the South Carolina Supreme
Court the question of whether a plaintiff may maintain a negligence action for
economic loss when injury to only the product itself is accompanied by a threat of
economic harm. This Comment disagrees with Colleton and argues that South
Carolina case law indicates problems with the economic loss rule generally and
suggests the state courts' willingness to carve out exceptions to the rule. These
cases, considered along with case law from other jurisdictions and with relevant
policy considerations, indicate that the South Carolina Supreme Court would likely
hold that the economic loss rule does not bar recovery for injury only to the product
itself if the defect involves a threat of bodily injury. Part II of this Comment

1. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 341, 384 S.E.2d 730, 734
(1989) (stating "tort liability only lies where the damage done is to other property or is personal
injury").
2. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871 (1986) (holding "a
manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under either a negligence or strict productsliability theory to prevent a product from injuring itself').
3. Id. at 868-69.
4. Id. at 869-70 (quoting Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d 1383, 1387 (Or. 1978)).
5. C.A. No. 2:04-531-18 (D.S.C. Sept. 6, 2005). See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text
for further discussion of Colleton.
6. A federal district court sitting in diversity "'must determine issues of state law as it believes
the highest court in the state would determine them."' Bessinger v. Food Lion, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d
574, 578 n.7 (D.S.C. 2003) (quoting Bettius & Sanderson, P.C. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 839 F.2d
1009, 1019 (4th Cir. 1988)).
7. Colleton Preparatory Acad., Inc., v. Hoover Universal, Inc., C.A. No. 2:04-531-18, slip op. at

11 (D.S.C. Sept. 6, 2005).
8. Colleton Preparatory Acad., Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., C.A. No. 2:04-531-18, slip op. at
8 (D.S.C. Jan. 31, 2006). The district court certified the question on the plaintiffs motion for
reconsideration of the court's original order. See id. at 1.
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discusses relevant South Carolina state and federal court decisions regarding
whether the economic loss rule bars recovery for injury to the product if a threat of
bodily harm accompanies this injury. Part m analyzes other state and federal court
decisions, and Part IV analyzes other factors to consider in determining whether an
exception to the economic loss rule should be recognized. The conclusion
summarizes the likely South Carolina scheme for allowing recovery for threat of
personal injury and the reasons behind this scheme.

II. SOUTH CAROLINA JURISPRUDENCE
A.

The Early FederalCourt View

The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina first hinted
at the possibility that the economic loss rule would not bar recovery for injury only
to the product itself if there was also a threat of bodily injury in City of Greenville
v. W.R. Grace& Co.9 In that case, the city filed suit to recover the cost of removing
and replacing asbestos fireproofing that was installed in the city hall' 0 While the
city suffered an economic loss, the district court saw "no indication that the South
Carolina Supreme Court would reject the view that asbestos contamination in
buildings is actionable in tort."" In reaching its conclusion, the district court
focused on the fact that the asbestos fireproofing had "contaminated the building,
damaging property and posing a continual hazard to building occupants and
workmen."' 2 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling,
determining the threat to life and health caused by asbestos contamination is "not
the type of risk that is normally allocated between the parties to a contract by
agreement." 3 The Fourth Circuit considered the risk ofharm caused by the asbestos
contamination and eventually concluded:
[T]he South Carolina courts would be willing to extend tort
liability to the manufacturer whose product threatens a substantial
and unreasonable risk of harm by releasing toxic substances into
the environment, thereby causing damage to the property owner
who has installed the harmful product in his building ....
We
think that a plaintiff such as Greenville should not be required to
wait until asbestos-related diseases manifest themselves before
maintaining an action for negligence against a manufacturer
whose product threatens a substantial and unreasonable risk of
harm by releasing toxic substances into the environment."

9. 640 F. Supp. 559 (D.S.C. 1986).
10. Id. at 562.
11. Id. at564.
12. Id.
13. City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace& Co., 827 F.2d 975, 978 (4th Cir. 1987).
14. Id.
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B. The South CarolinaCourt ofAppeals'Rejection of a Threat Exception
A year after the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Grace, the South Carolina Court of
Appeals held in CarolinaWinds Owners 'Ass'n v. Joe Harden Builder,Inc.'" that
the economic loss rule prevents the imposition of tort liability on a builder for
alleged cracking in the exterior facial brick walls of a condominium building.16 In
the only South Carolina state court decision to discuss recovery for a defective
product with a threat of bodily injury, the court rejected the idea that "a negligence
action may be maintained against a builder where the risk of personal injury exists,
but personal injury has not in fact resulted."' 7 The CarolinaWinds court gave two
basic reasons for its holding. First, reasoning that a "buyer does not have to wait
until a personal injury occurs" because "he may recover damages to remedy the
defect by suing the seller forthwith for breach of the warranty of fitness arising
from the initial sale," the CarolinaWinds court rejected the idea that it was unfair
for a buyer to have to wait for injury to occur before recovering damages in tort.'
The second reason was based on their disagreement with the suggestion that the
distinction between recovery in tort and recovery in warranty rested upon the
"'fortuitous circumstance of the nature of the resultant damage"1 9 and on several
important reasons for limiting the buyer to contract remedies.
The court stated that "[t]he gravamen of a negligence action is the existence of
actual damage to the person of the plaintiff" and that "damage is uncertain until
actual injury results."2 Therefore, the "quantum of damage" is uncertain without
actual injury; damages would be based on speculation and would not bear a
reasonable relation to the plaintiffs actual loss.2 ' The court also emphasized that
"[t]he law of negligence does not make an actor an insurer against all possible harm
he may cause" and that to prevent the defendant from becoming the insurer for
every "mere risk of harm ... ,some limiting principle is required."22

15. 297 S.C. 74, 374 S.E.2d 897 (CL App. 1988), overruled by Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber &
Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 384 S.E.2d 730 (1989).
16. Id. at 89, 374 S.E.2d at 906.
17. Id. at 85, 89, 374 S.E.2d at 904, 906.
18. Id. at 86, 374 S.E.2d at 904.
19. Id. at 86, 374 S.E.2d at 904 (quoting Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condo. Inc. v. WhitingTurner Contracting Co., 517 A.2d 336, 345 (Md. 1986)).
20. Id. at 86-87, 374 S.E.2d at 904-05.
21. Carolina Winds Owners' Ass'n v. Joe Harden Builder, Inc., 297 S.C. 74, 87, 374 S.E.2d 897,
905 (Ct. App. 1988), overruledby Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber& Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 384 S.E.2d
730 (1989).
22. Id. at 87-88, 374 S.E.2d at 905 (citing Carter v. R.L. Jordan Oil Co., 294 S.C. 435, 444, 365
S.E.2d 324, 329 (Ct.App. 1988)). The lack of any "principled way to categorize types or degrees of risk
for the purpose of establishing liability" troubled the CarolinaWinds court because the "calculation of
risk is a complex, fact intensive, infinitely varied, and inevitably imprecise process... far beyond the
competence of judges or juries." Id. at 88, 374 S.E.2d at 905. However, if Judge Bell's statement is

correct, then presumably, trying a negligence action is impossible-as judges and juries routinely
employ the Hand formula to perform this type of risk calculation in negligence actions. See United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 160 F.2d 482 (1947).
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C. Criticism of the Carolina Winds Decision
The CarolinaWinds court's reasoning is questionable on several grounds. First,
the implied warranty claims favored in CarolinaWinds were essentially negligence
claims. Despite its problems with a negligence action, the court noted that the
builder could "be held responsible for defective workmanship without blurring the
distinction between contract and tort" because the home builder gave "an implied
warranty that the work undertaken will be performed in a careful, diligent,
workmanlike manner."23 The implied warranty of workmanlike quality may involve
' and "may overlap with negligence
a "negligence-type standard ofreasonable care"24
in that the standard for breach may be similar, even though statute of limitations or
recoverable damages may vary."25 Furthermore, Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber &
Manufacturing Co.26 makes it clear that privity between the home builder and the
buyer is irrelevant in an action for implied warranty of workmanlike quality. The
court has been "steadfast in holding that privity of contract as a defense to an
implied warranty action is abolished in this State."2
Second, allowing recovery for a defective product that threatens bodily harm
solely under warranty law increases the likelihood that some parties, who should
be entitled to a remedy, may be left without a claim. If no tort liability exists, a
plaintiff may have no method for recovering the costs of repairing a defect where
the statute of limitations on a warranty claim has expired before the defect's
discovery, or where the product is covered by only a limited warranty or no
warranty at all. In addition, the Carolina Winds court recognized that although
"warranty gives the injured party, i.e., the person who contracted to have
construction work done, a claim for damages for loss of his expectancy," the parties
also have the "opportunity to adjust the allocation of risk by agreement, if they so
desire."28 Thus, the ability to adjust risk allocation strengthens the argument for
allowing a negligence claim because, if only warranty liability exists, more
sophisticated parties may take advantage of less sophisticated parties and contract
around the warranty to avoid liability-leaving the injured party with no remedy.
Furthermore, though allocation of the risk of personal injury between parties of
equal sophistication and bargaining power may be desirable,29 such allocation is

23. Id. at 84, 374 S.E.2d at 903 (citing Hill v. Polar Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 271, 64 S.E.2d 885,

888 (1951)).
24. F. PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERT L. FELIX, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 274 (3d ed.
2004). It is unclear whether the warranty demonstrates a concern for how the work is done, which
would indicate "a negligence-type standard of reasonable care," or only a concern for the result of the
work, which would indicate a contract-type standard of "whether the work done produced a result that
was adequate for the purpose involved." Id.
25. Id. at 292.
26. 299 S.C. 335, 384 S.E.2d 730 (1989).
27. Id. at 344, 384 S.E.2d at 736 (citing Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 398, 271 S.E.2d 768,

769-70 (1980)).
28. CarolinaWinds, 297 S.C. at 84, 374 S.E.2d at 903.
29. See Palmetto Linen Service, Inc. v. U.N.X., Inc., 205 F.3d 126, 129-30 (4th Cir. 2000);
Laurens Elec. Coop. v. Altec Indus., Inc., 889 F.2d 1323, 1324 (4th Cir. 1989); Purvis v. Consol.
Energy Prods. Co., 674 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1982); S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
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questionable when the parties are not equal.3 ° Whether only warranty liability is
sufficient for situations where equality in sophistication and bargaining power
exists between the parties is a question to be resolved at a later time.31
Finally, contrary to the Carolina Winds court's suggestion, allowing a
negligence claim where a threat of bodily harm exists does not make a person an
insurer against every risk of harm-rather the person is responsible only for those
risks of harm created by his own negligence. Moreover, the liability amount is for
actual harm, not the potential harm resulting from some risk. While the damage and

quantum of damage are uncertain until actual harm occurs, the measure of damages
in these cases is not speculative: the damages sought are the costs to remove or
repair the dangerous condition, and these costs can be easily calculated.
D. The South CarolinaSupreme Court's View of the Economic Loss Rule
In any event, Carolina Winds cannot be viewed as determinate on the economic
loss rule because in Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Manufacturing Co.,32 the

South Carolina Supreme Court stated: "To the degree herein indicated, we express

our disapproval and rejection of [CarolinaWinds]., 33 The "degree" of the court's
rejection of Carolina Winds is unclear because Kennedy focuses on the duty of

home builders. In "join[ing] those states which strive to protect the modem new
' the Kennedy court explained its difficulty with the following
home buyer,"34
example: "Builder 'A' and Builder 'B' can be equally blameworthy, and build
equally shoddy housing, but because Builder 'A's' negligence happened to be
discovered early enough, no one was harmed. It hardly seems fair that Builder 'A'
should profit from a diligent buyer's discovery, or because he was fortunate." 3

826 F. Supp. 1549, 1557 (D.S.C. 1993); Bishop Logging Co. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 317 S.C.
520, 530, 455 S.E.2d 189, 183 (Ct. App. 1995). But see City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 827
F.2d 975, 978 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that the risk of serious physical harm "is not the type of risk that
is normally allocated between the parties to a contract"); Purvis, 674 F.2d at 222 (noting that "[i]t is the
nature of the risk that caused injury, rather than the nature of the parties, which is finally
determinative").
30. The rules concerning allocation of risk in negligence through express assumption of risk are
more strict than the contract rules for allocation of risk. Cf Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383
P.2d 441, 441-42 (Cal. 1963) (concluding that "a release from liability for future negligence imposed
as a condition for admission to a charitable research hospital" affected the public interest and had to be
declared invalid under a state statute).
31. For a brief discussion of whether the South Carolina Supreme Court might consider the nature
of the parties in applying an exception to the economic loss rule for threat of bodily harm,see infra Part
IV.B.
32. Interestingly, the Kennedy court discussed liability in tort even though the plaintiff amended
his complaint to delete the negligence cause of action. Kennedy, 299 S.C. at 338, 345-47, 384 S.E.2d
at 733, 736-37.
33. Id. at 341, 384 S.E.2d at 734. In Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing& Heating Co. v. Jordan,Jones
& Goulding, Inc., Justice Toal, the author of the Kennedy opinion, wrote that "any reliance on Carolina
Winds by the trial judge was an error of law." 320 S.C. 49, 52, 463 S.E.2d 85, 87 (1995) (emphasis
added).
34. Kennedy, 299 S.C. at 346, 384 S.E.2d at 737.
35. Id. at 345, 384 S.E.2d at 737.
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Focusing on the act of negligent construction rather than its consequences, the court

concluded a "builder may be liable to a home buyer in tort despite the fact that the
buyer suffered only 'economic losses' where . ..the builder has constructed36
housing that he knows or should know will pose serious risks of physical harm.

In shifting the focus from consequence to activity and the nature of risk, the South
Carolina Supreme Court shifted the focus of the economic loss rule.37 Under
Carolina Winds, recovery in tort rested upon the fortuity of the nature of the actual
resulting personal injury, while Kennedy indicates luck should not play an all-ornothing role in determining whether a plaintiff may bring a claim for recovery in
tort or only in contract. Specifically, the Kennedy court stated that "[a] builder is
no less blameworthy in such a case
where lady luck has smiled upon him and no
3
physical harm has yet occurred. 1
While federal courts have viewed Kennedy as limited to the residential home
building context, 39 in Kershaw County BoardofEducationv. UnitedStates Gypsum

Co.,' the South Carolina Supreme Court indicated its willingness to extend
Kennedy's reach. In Kershaw, the court upheld a jury verdict against an asbestos
manufacturer for the cost of removing asbestos contaminated materials from several
schools.4' Without addressing any exception for threat of bodily injury, the court,
following Grace and Kennedy, determined the economic loss rule did not apply
because the plaintiff had "alleged and offered proof of other property damage."'42
In discussing its decision in Kennedy, the Kershaw court stated:
We also noted our difficulty with the economic loss rule

generally, and we partially rejected the rule in the residential
home building context. We have not yet been presented with the
question of whether the rule should be so rejected in all contexts,

36. Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 347, 384 S.E.2d 730, 738 (1989).
37. Benjamin Edward Nicholson V, Unanswered Questions: The Economic Loss Rule in South
Carolina, S.C. LAW., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 25, 28. The South Carolina Supreme Court has reaffirmed
Kennedy on several occasions. In Beachwalk Villas Condominium Ass'n v. Martin, 305 S.C. 144, 146,
406 S.E.2d 372, 374 (1991), the court stated that an "extension of the holding in Kennedy to architects
is a logical expansion of our law to provide protection for homebuyers." Then, in Tommy L. Griffin
Plumbing& HeatingCo., the court saw "no logical reason to insulate design professionals from liability
when the relationship between the design professional and the plaintiff is such that the design
professional owes a professional duty to the plaintiff arising separate and distinct from any contractual
duties between the parties or with third parties." 320 S.C. at 55, 463 S.E.2d at 89.
38. Kennedy, 299 S.C. at 346, 384 S.E.2d at 737.
39. See Brendle's Stores, Inc. v. OTR, 978 F.2d 150, 156 (4th Cir. 1992); Myrtle Beach Pipeline
Corp. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 843 F. Supp. 1027, 1050 (D.S.C. 1993), aftd, 46 F.3d 1125 (4th Cir. 1995);
S.C. Elec. & Gas v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1549, 1556 (D.S.C. 1993) (unpublished
table decision).
40. 302 S.C. 390, 396 S.E.2d 369 (1990).
41. Id. at 392, 399, 396 S.E.2d at 370-71, 374.
42. Id. at 394, 396 S.E.2d at 371.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol57/iss3/12

6

Gissendanner: Tort Recovery for Defective Products Posing a Threat of Bodily Ha
TORT LAW

2006]

including the commercial arena, and we need not address that
issue here, as this case may be disposed of on narrower grounds. 3
Kershaw does not indicate that Kennedy's rejection of the economic loss rule
should only apply in the home building context. Rather, Kershaw indicates the
court dislikes the economic loss rule and, if presented with the question in other
situations, might similarly limit the rule's application.
E. A FederalDistrict Court'sRecent Rejection of a Threat Exception
In Colleton, the district court initially determined the economic loss rule barred
recovery for threat of bodily injury when the only actual injury was to the product
itself." The court denied the plaintiffs negligence claim against a fire retardant
manufacturer for costs of temporary repairs and complete replacement of the
roofing and roof framing system in which the manufacturer's product was used to
treat plywood and structural lumber.45 However, on the plaintiffs motion for
reconsideration, the district court certified the following question to the South
Carolina Supreme Court: "May a user of a defective product maintain a negligence
action against the manufacturer when the resulting damage is limited to the
defective product, if the product poses a serious risk of physical harm?"' In both
the original order and the certification order, the district court rejected the plaintiff's
reliance on Grace.47 The Colleton court reasoned that the South Carolina Supreme
Court "could have included 'threat of personal injury' as an additional instance in
which tort liability lies" if the exception actually existed in South Carolina.4" There
are two flaws with this reasoning. First, any statement in Kennedy or Kershaw on
this issue would have been dicta because in both cases the court did not have to
reach the issue of whether a threat of bodily harm exception existed. In short,
because the South Carolina Supreme Court has never addressed the "threat"
exception, it has neither recognized nor rejected the exception. Therefore, the
Colleton court's reliance on the South Carolina Supreme Court's omission of

43. Id. at 393, 396 S.E.2d at 371 (footnote and citation omitted.) The court used the "narrower
grounds" of "other property damage" to dispose of the case. See infra notes 50- 53 and accompanying
text for an argument that the asbestos contamination in Kershaw constituted other property damage
because it caused a threat of cancer.
44. Colleton Preparatory Acad., Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., C.A. No. 2:04-531-18, slip op.
at 11 (D.S.C. Sept. 6, 2005)
45. Id. at 3, 7-14. The court did, however, allow the plaintiff to recover on other grounds. Id. at
16.
46. Colleton Preparatory Acad., Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., C.A. No. 2:04-531-18, slip op. at
8 (D.S.C. Jan. 31, 2006).
47. Colleton Preparatory Acad., Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., C.A. No. 2:04-531-18, slip op.
at 9-10 (D.S.C. Sept. 6, 2005); Colleton Preparatory Acad., Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., C.A. No.
2:04-531-18, slip op. at 7 (D.S.C. Jan. 31, 2006).
48. Colleton Preparatory Acad., Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., C.A. No. 2:04-531-18, slip op. at

10 (D.S.C. Sept. 6, 2005).
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recognizing an exception is misplaced.49 Second, nothing in Kershaw or Grace
indicates that the holdings only apply to asbestos.
Kershaw's facts indicate at least an acceptance of some version of the threat
exception. Kershaw focused on "other property damage,"5 but exactly what
constitutes "other property" is unclear."' The court apparently viewed the asbestos
as having damaged other property by contamination. This view is consistent with
a comment in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: ProductsLiability,which provides:

One category of claims stands apart. In the case of asbestos
contamination in buildings, most courts have taken the position
that the contamination constitutes harm to the building as other
property. The serious health threat caused by asbestos
contamination has led the courts to this conclusion. Thus, actions
seeking recovery for the costs of asbestos removal have been held
to be within the purview of products liability law rather than

commercial law. 2

However, asbestos contamination damages other property because of the threat of
bodily harm, i.e., the potential exposure of a building's inhabitants to the
carcinogenic asbestos fibers. Asbestos contamination does not otherwise cause the
destruction of property or the inability to use property for its intended purpose.

Therefore, in the asbestos context, the other property damage is the threat of cancer.
If the threat of harm constitutes other property damage, then the Colleton threat of

truss failures, possible roof collapse, and resulting injury or death" may meet
Kershaw's other property damage test.

49. Even if a threat of bodily injury exception exists in South Carolina, the district court's ultimate
decision to deny the plaintiff's negligence claim may have been correct as the deteriorating flame
retardant treated lumber may not have created a sufficient threat of bodily injury under a risk of harm
analysis. See infra notes 91 and 148.
50. Kershaw County Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 302 S.C. 390, 393, 396 S.E.2d 369, 371
(1990).
51. In City of Manchesterv. NationalGypsum Co., 637 F. Supp. 646 (D.R.I. 1986), another case
involving asbestos, the district court notes that it is "somewhat artificial to try to characterize the
damage ... as either physical damage to .. .property or economic damage." Id. at 649. In cases
involving asbestos or other hazardous or toxic chemicals, courts have characterized the damage as
economic damage, property damage, or a "hybrid of the two." Id. at 650. In this case, the city sued "for
damages associated with the placement, removal and replacement of asbestos" from schools and other
public buildings. Id. at 647. The plaintiff claimed that the complaint "implicitly alleges physical harm
to property because it claims the contamination of plaintiff's schools and public buildings with
'unreasonably dangerous' asbestos products, which made the buildings unsafe, thereby damaging the
buildings and requiring the costly removal of the asbestos so as to restore the structures to their prior
safe condition." Id. at 649. The district court found that the city "made a sufficient allegation of physical
harm to its property so as to state claims for negligence and strict liability." Id. at 652.
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e (1998).
53. Colleton Preparatory Acead., Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., C.A. No. 2:04-531-18, slip op.
at 8 (D.S.C. Sept. 6, 2005)
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III. OTHER JURISDICTIONS

A.

The United States Supreme Court's View

Jurisdictions rejecting a threat of bodily injury exception have given great
weight to the United States Supreme Court's decision in East River Steamship
Corp. v. TransamericaDelaval Inc.54 In that case, the Court answered in the
negative the questibn of "whether [in an admiralty case] a cause of action in tort is
stated when a defective product purchased in a commercial transaction
malfunctions, injuring only the product itself and causing purely economic loss.""
The Court determined the decrease in a product's value because of malfunction, the
unhappiness of customers who find the product does not meet their needs, and the
increased costs in performing services are "[f]osses . . .[that] can be insured."56
Determining that "[d]amage to a product itself is most naturally understood as a
warranty claim,"57 the Court held "a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has
no duty under either a negligence or strict products-liability theory to prevent a
product from injuring itself.""8
Importantly, East River only dealt with commercial transactions and did not
address the situation of ordinary consumer purchases where there may be disparity
in the parties' relative bargaining power. Also, because East River was in
admiralty,59that case is only persuasive authority in a diversity case or a decision
by the South Carolina Supreme Court.
B.

Courts Rejecting a ThreatException

The analysis employed by courts that reject a threat exception to the economic
loss rule has generally been less thoughtful than the analysis employed by courts
that recognize the exception. Most courts rejecting the exception have not wrestled
with policy issues for or against the exception and have relied heavily on higher
courts' failure to explicitly recognize an exception. The Colleton court cited Mt.
Lebanon Personal Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc.6" and Pulte Home
Corp. v. Osmose Wood Preserving,Inc.61 in support of its denial of the school's
claim.62 In Mt. Lebanon, flame retardant chemicals in wood trusses of a nursing
home cafeteria caused structural failure.63 The Sixth Circuit noted the economic loss
rule should apply in Kentucky commercial transactions because "(1) it maintains

54. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
55. Id. at 859, 870.

56. Id. at 871-72.
57. Id. at 872.
58. Id. at 871.

at 859.
59. Id.
60. 276 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 2002).
61. 60 F.3d 734 (1 ith Cir. 1995).
62. Colleton Preparatory Acad., Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., C.A. No. 2:04-531-18, slip op. at
11 n.2 (D.S.C. Sept. 6, 2005).
63. Mt. Lebanon, 276 F.3d at 847.
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the historical distinction between tort and contract law; (2) it protects parties'
freedom to allocate economic risk by contract; and (3) it encourages the party best
situated to assess the risk of economic loss, usually the purchaser, to assume,
allocate, or insure against that risk."" The court rejected the nursing home's
argument that the "Kentucky Supreme Court would adopt an exception to the
economic loss doctrine where the injury to the product created a serious risk of
injury to a person or property .... predict[ing] that the Kentucky Supreme Court
would reject a serious risk of injury exception to the economic loss rule." 5 The
Sixth Circuit's only support for its prediction that the Kentucky Supreme Court
would reject the exception was the United States Supreme Court's East River
decision and the exception's rejection by the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability."
In Pulte Home Corp., chemicals caused plywood used in townhouses to
deteriorate.67 The Eleventh Circuit specifically found only two exceptions to
Florida's economic loss rule-physical injury and damage to other property.68 In
rejecting the negligence claim, the court noted that the Florida Supreme Court had
"refus[ed] to create additional exceptions to the [economic loss] rule. 69
In both Mt. Lebanon and Pulte Home Corp., the federal courts sitting in
diversity merely rejected the arguments for the threat exception without examining
the possibility that state courts would support policy arguments in favor of
recognizing such an exception.
Other federal district courts have similarly rejected the threat exception because
the state courts have not explicitly recognized the exception. In Adams-Arapahoe
School DistrictNo. 28-J v. GAF Corp.,7 another asbestos case, the Tenth Circuit
stated:
The School District's claim of injury in the mere presence of VAT
[vinyl asbestos floor tile] appears to be little more than an
invitation to recognize some fictional property damage as a
vehicle upon which to carry an economic loss action into the
province of tort law. While the presence of asbestos in VAT may
well impose increased renovation costs, any additional expense is
best characterized as economic loss-consequential damages
resulting from the failure of VAT to meet the School District's
economic expectations in terms of performance. 7

64. Id. at 848 (quoting 2 LOuis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 13.07[1] (2000)).
65. Id. at 852-53.
66. Id. at 853.
67. Pulte Home Corp. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 60 F.3d 734, 736 (11 th Cir. 1995).
68. Id. at 741.
69. Id. at 740 (citing Casa Clara Condo. Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, 620 So. 2d 1244,
1247-48 (Fla. 1993)).
70. 959 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1992).
71. Id. at 872.
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The court found nothing in any Colorado decision to support the idea that "tort
liability may be premised on the mere risk of harn" and noted that in "asbestos in
buildings" cases, "[t]ort actions can be maintained only where plaintiffs explicitly
allege and subsequent evidence demonstrates contamination of the building or other
property as a result of fibers released from asbestos products. In other words, only
72
asbestos contamination constitutes a physical injury compensable under tort law."
Interestingly, even courts recognizing the exception and applying a risk of harm
analysis may have reached a similar result in this case because they too believe that
mere risk of harm is not sufficient to impose tort liability.
Similarly, in Drieblattv. Osmose, Inc.," the plaintiffs sued because defective
fire retardant-treated plywood sheets caused the roofs of various condominium
buildings to deteriorate.74 The defendants relied on the Eleventh Circuit's
conclusion in Pulte that "'[h]aving failed to avail itself of the opportunity to
mitigate the risks of potential disappointment at the time of contract negotiation,
Pulte cannot now resort to the courts to save it from a bargain improvidently
made.'"" The plaintiffs relied on the reasoning in Trustees of Columbia University
v. Mitchell/GiurgolaAssociates76 in which the First Department of New York
State's Appellate Division "decreed an exception to the economic loss rule for
'unduly dangerous product[s] for which damages under a strict liability theory may
be maintained."' 77 However, the district court rejected this reasoning, finding that
"[n]o Massachusetts court has suggested or held that in Massachusetts there is an
exception to the economic loss rule for collapse cases."7 " Because federal court

decisions have not yet reached the merits of the exception, they provide little
support for its rejection.
Much like federal court opinions, state court opinions that reject the threat of
bodily injury exception provide little insight into the rationale for rejecting the
exception. In L.L. Bean, Inc. v. United States Mineral Products Co.,"9 plaintiffs
argued for a contamination exception "where a product has made its surroundings
dangerous.""0 Like the federal courts that rejected the exception because the highest
state court had not yet recognized, one, the Superior Court of Maine rejected the
plaintiffs argument and noted that courts recognizing an exception limited its
application to asbestos or formaldehyde contamination cases or to cases involving
collapsing walls."1 The court further noted the state's highest court had not

72. Id. (citing City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975, 976-78 (4th Cir. 1987);
Kershaw County Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 302 S.C. 390, 394, 396 S.E.2d 369, 371 (1990)).
73. No. 00-CV-1 1392-MEL, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2326 (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 2001).
74. Id. at*1.
75. Id. at *4-5 (quoting Pulte Home Corp. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 60 F.3d 734, 742
(lIth Cir. 1995)).
76. 492 N.Y.S.2d 371 (App. Div. 1985).
77. Drieblatt,2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2326, at *5 (quoting Trs. ofColumbia Univ., 492 N.Y.S.2d
at 376).
78. Id. at *7.
79. No. CV-98-632, 1999 Me. Super. LEXIS 323 (Super. Ct Me. Dec. 3, 1999).
80. Id. at *10.
81. Id.
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indicated that it would recognize an exception to the economic loss rule in the case
of mold spore contamination.82
Interestingly, some state courts recognized strong arguments for a threat
exception even though they ultimately rejected this exception to the economic loss
rule. In KB Home v. Superior Court,3 the plaintiff urged the adoption of a "lifesafety-defect exception to the economic loss rule," arguing that "the defective
furnaces... created an undisputed, active fire hazard, which resulted in a number
of homes actually being destroyed (although not the homes at issue in this
proceeding) and that, if left unrepaired, there was a substantial risk of significant
personal injury to the occupants of the homes.""H Despite finding the plaintiff's
policy arguments for the exception "compelling," the court held that the California
Supreme Court had "unequivocally rejected such a life-safety exception." 5
C. JurisdictionsRecognizing a Threat Exception
1. Maryland's Two-PartApproach
Perhaps the most compelling argument in favor of recognizing an exception for
threat of bodily harm is the argument employed by the Maryland Court of Appeals
in Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner
ContractingCo.,6 a case involving allegations that a condominium builder installed
a defective electrical system, which created a fire hazard to the building's
occupants.8 In Atlantis Condominium, the Maryland court concluded:
[W]hether a duty will be imposed... should depend upon the risk
generated by the negligent conduct, rather than upon the
fortuitous circumstance of the nature of the resultant damage.
Where the risk is of death or personal injury the action will lie for
recovery of the reasonable cost of correcting the dangerous
condition.8"

82. Id. at*ll.
83. 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587 (Ct. App. 2003), rehg denied, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 1715 (Ct. App. Nov.

19, 2003).
84. Id. at 597.
85. Id. (citing Aas v. Superior Court, 12 P.3d 1125, 1140 (Cal. 2000)).
86. 517 A.2d 336 (Md. 1986). In Carolina Winds, the plaintiffs, even though they did not allege
a risk of death or serious personal injury to themselves, unsuccessfully argued for the court to recognize
a threat exception and to adopt the reasoning of the Maryland Court of Appeals. Carolina Winds
Owners' Ass'n v. Joe Harden Builder, Inc., 297 S.C. 74, 85- 88, 88 n. 11,374 S.E.2d 897, 903-06, 906
n.II (Ct. App. 1988).
87. Atlantis Condo., 517 A.2d at 338.
88. Id. at 345 (footnote omitted). Interestingly, as the South Carolina Supreme Court would do
three years later in Kennedy, the Atlantis Condominium court shifted the focus of the economic loss rule
from consequence to activity. See Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 384 S.E.2d

730 (1989).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol57/iss3/12

12

Gissendanner: Tort Recovery for Defective Products Posing a Threat of Bodily Ha
TORT LAW

20061

Recognizing a need for a limitation on liability to prevent the defendant from
becoming the insurer for every "mere risk of harm without the occurrence of
harm,"89 the Atlantis Condominium court stated:

It is the serious nature of the risk that persuades us to
recognize the cause of action in the absence of actual injury.
Accordingly, conditions that present a risk to general health,
welfare, or comfort but fall short of presenting a clear danger of
death or personal injury will not suffice. A claim that defective
design or construction has produced a drafty condition that may
lead to a cold or pneumonia would not be sufficient.9"
The Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving9 court clarified the method of
determining the degree of risk required to circumvent the economic loss rule. In
that case, the Maryland Supreme Court articulated a two-part approach:
We examine both the nature of the damage threatened and the
probability of damage occurring to determine whether the two,
viewed together, exhibit a clear, serious, and unreasonable risk of
death or personal injury. Thus, if the possible injury is
extraordinarily severe, i.e., multiple deaths, we do not require the
probability of the injury occurring to be as high as we would
require if the injury threatened were less severe, i.e. a broken leg
or damage to property. Likewise, if the probability of the injury
occurring is extraordinarily high, we do not require the injury to
be as severe as we would if the probability of injury were lower.92
While this approach would probably not satisfy the Carolina Winds court, the
Maryland Supreme Court's statement indicates the type of balancing approach
courts regularly undertake.93 Furthermore, as the Morris court noted, this two-part
89. Carolina Winds, 297 S.C. at 87, 374 S.E.2d at 905.
90. Atlantis Condo., 517 A.2d at 345 n.5.
91. 667 A.2d 624 (Md. 1994) (4-3 decision). This case, like Colleton, involved defective fire
retardant treated (FRT) plywood. Id. at 628. While the justices essentially agreed on the basic test, they
disagreed on its application. Under facts similar to Colleton, the Morris majority dismissed the
plaintiffs' tort claims, reasoning that "the alleged defects do not present a substantial risk of death or
serious physical injury." Id. at 633. The dissent by Justice Eldridge argued that "[t]he danger that

someone will be injured when a roof is constructed with defective materials is more of a probability
than a possibility." Id. at 640 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). Justice Eldridge further argued that "if a
defective and deteriorating roof that is unable to withstand weight does not present an 'extreme' risk,
the cause of action recognized in... [Atlantis Condominium] may be illusory." Id. at 641.
92. Id. at 631-32 (majority opinion).

93. In Atlantis Condominium, plaintiffs alleged the defendant's "failure to construct ten vertical
utility shafts with materials having a fire resistance rating of two hours" put all of the condominium's
residents at risk of death or personal injury should a fire occur in one of the shafts. Atlantis Condo., 517
A.2d at 338. In discussing the Atlantis Condominium opinion, the MorrisCourt noted that although the

probability that a fire would result from the construction defect was not high, it would "allow[] the
plaintiffs to maintain a tort action because the nature of the possible damage," i.e., multiple deaths and
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approach "recognizes the negative effects that could occur if the economic loss rule
was abandoned... [but] balances these considerations... against the public policy
of encouraging people to correct dangerous conditions before a tragedy results."94
In EastRiver, the United States Supreme Court characterized this degree of risk
approach as "too indeterminate to enable manufacturers easily to structure their
business behavior."95 The Morris court responded to this criticism by stating its
two-part approach "withstands the criticism of the United States Supreme Court"
because the risk of harm analysis "does not cause major disruptions" in either the
"actual manufacturing and marketing of the product" or in "allocation of funds to
cover potential tort liability"--the two areas that "manufacturers' exposure to tort
liability requires them to modify their business behavior."96 The Morris court
reasoned that "manufacturers, regardless of the extent of tort liability, should
always attempt to mitigate risks of death or personal injury" and that the "rule,
because of the extreme nature of the risk required to trigger it, limits liability to,
predominately, those situations in which either liability would inevitably be created
by actual physical injury or the manufacturer's exposure to liability is so great that
'
it cannot be ignored."97

2.

The Washington Reasoningfor a Risk of Harm Analysis

The Washington Supreme Court also adopted a risk of harm analysis,9" which

"appropriately accommodates the safety and risk-spreading policies that underlie
the law of product liability[] and 'provides a workable and accurate distinction
between accidents that should be actionable in tort and losses that should remain

personal injuries was extremely serious. Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 667 A.2d 624, 632 (Md.
1994) (4-3 decision). Morris also cited UnitedStates Gypsum Co. v. Mayor ofBaltimore, 647 A.2d 405
(Md. 1994), in which the court allowed a tort claim where the "possible injury-inhalation of asbestos
fibers causing serious diseases-was coupled with a high probability that personal injuries thereby
would result because everyone who used the building could have been exposed to asbestos fibers."
Morris, 667 A.2d at 632.
94. Morris, 667 A.2d at 632. The Maryland court argued the exception is necessary to encourage
people to fix hazards when discovered rather than waiting for an injury to occur. Id. This argument is
somewhat flawed because if the plaintiffs had actual knowledge of a hazard and declined to fix the
problem, they would probably find themselves liable for negligence. However, it is conceivable that the
statute of limitations on a warranty claim could have expired before discovery of the defect or that a
product's warranty coverage may be limited or nonexistent. In these cases, a tort action would be the
only available means of recovering the cost of repairing the defects. Thus, the possibility of tort liability
would act as an additional incentive to encourage people to correct dangerous conditions before a
tragedy results.
95. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 870 (1986).
96. Morris, 667 A.2d at 632-33.
97. Id.
98. Wash. Water Power Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 774 P.2d 1199, 1207 (Wash. 1989). This
analysis, adopted from PennsylvaniaGlass Sand Corp. v. CaterpillarTractorCo., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d
Cir. 1981), requires the court to consider the particular circumstances of a given case and .'analyz[e]
interrelated factors such as the nature of the defect, the type of risk, and the manner in which the injury
arose."' Graybar, 774 P.2d at 1207 (quoting Pa. Glass Sand Corp., 652 F.2d at 1173).
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in the domain of warranty law."' 99 Like the Maryland Court of Appeals, the
Washington Supreme Court believed that the fact that only the product itself was
injured as a result of the hazardous product defect was a result of fortuitous
circumstances."' The court noted the East River approach of restricting product
injury claims to contract theories gives manufacturers a way "to limit their
liabilities to predictable plaintiffs and manageable sums" and "reduces uncertainty
in judicial decisionmaking" by providing a bright-line rule-both essential goals
of Washington tort reform.' However, the court reasoned that "this increased
certainty comes at too high a price. If manufacturers can contract successfully
around liabilities for product injuries, a principal deterrent to unsafe practices-the
threat of legal liability-will be lost."'0 2
3.

DistinguishingBetween Disappointedand EndangeredUsers

Some jurisdictions recognizing a threat of bodily injury exception have
recognized a distinction between disappointed users and endangered users." 3 In
PennsylvaniaGlass Sand Corp. v. CaterpillarTractorCo.,' the court noted:
[A]hmost all courts have adopted the view that the benefit-of-thebargain approach of warranty law is ill-suited to correct problems
of hazardous products that cause physical injury. Manufacturers
are better able to bear the risk or to take action to correct flaws
that pose a danger. Accordingly, tort law imposes a duty on
manufacturers to produce safe items, regardless of whether the
ultimate impact of the hazard is on people, other property, or the
product itself.
In cases such as the present one where only the defective
product is damaged, the majority approach is to identify whether
a particular injury amounts to economic loss or physical damage.
In drawing this distinction, the items for which damages are
sought, such as repair costs, are not determinative. Rather, the line
between tort and contract must be drawn by analyzing interrelated

99. Graybar, 774 P.2d at 1210 (quoting Lindley J. Brenza, Comment, Asbestos in Schools and
the EconomicLoss Doctrine, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 277, 300 (1987)).
100. Id. at 1210.
101. Id. at 1209.
102. Id.
103. In American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Ford Motor Co., the Iowa Supreme Court held that

recovery under a tort theory was possible in the case where a "truck caught fire causing property
damage to the truck and its contents." 588 N.W.2d 437, 438 (Iowa 1999). The court noted that other
Iowa cases "distinguished the disappointed consumers from the endangered ones." Id. at 440.
104. 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981). In Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equipment Co., the Third Circuit
receded from PennsylvaniaGlass Sand and "predict[ed] that Pennsylvania courts, although not bound
to do so, would nevertheless adopt as state law the Supreme Court's reasoning in East River," which
"specifically rejected [their] Pennsylvania Glass Sand position." 816 F.2d 110, 111 (3d Cir. 1987).

However, other jurisdictions have continued to utilize the Pennsylvania Glass Sand analysis. See supra
note 98.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2006

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 12
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57: 619

factors such as the nature of the defect, the type of risk, and the
manner in which the injury arose. These factors bear directly on
whether the safety-insurance policy of tort law or the expectationbargain protection policy of warranty law is most applicable to a
particular claim.l°5
Applying the Pennsylvania Glass Sand reasoning, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania concluded the plaintiffs stated a valid tort claim by claiming "the
installation of urea formaldehyde insulation in their residences .

.

. resulted in

property damages and a diminution in the fair market value of their homes."1 °6 The
plaintiffs argued the use of a cancer-causing agent resulted in a decline in the
property's value.'07 The court found it significant that the plaintiffs were "neither
seek[ing] to protect their expectation interests nor secure the benefit of the bargain.
Rather, plaintiffs complain that the insulation contains a hazardous defect."' '
In PhiladelphiaNational Bank v. Dow Chemical Co., °9 the same court heard
a case in which the plaintiff contended the defendant's use of Sarabond "caused
corrosion of metals embedded in the mortar and brick panels of its building and
[caused] cracking of the masonry on the exterior of the building."" 0 This court
determined "Pennsylvania would permit recovery in tort where an allegedly
defective construction product causes injury to other components used in
construction and creates a real, unspeculative risk of harm to passers-by on the
street below.'
Interestingly, the district court noted the Third Circuit in East
River Steamship Corp. v. Delaval Turbine, Inc. 2 applied the PennsylvaniaGlass
Sand factors but still denied recovery under a tort theory.' The court also noted
that other cases involving the use of asbestos products "concluded that the risk of
injury to persons and/or property implicated the safety concerns of strict liability
as opposed to the expectation-bargain policies of contract law."'' These cases
"relied upon the fact that asbestos presents a real, unspeculative health hazard and
that additional property had been damaged inasmuch as repair necessitated removal
of more than the defective asbestos product alone.""..5 The court also noted that in
asbestos cases, "the product itself is inherently dangerous to people. No outside
intervention is required to make the defect hazardous."" 6
In Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sheehan,' " the Alaska Supreme Court
reaffirmed that "a litigant may recover economic loss in strict products liability if

105. Pa. Glass Sand, 652 F.2d at 1172-73. (footnote omitted)
106. Pearl v. Allied Corp., 566 F. Supp. 400, 400-02 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
107. Id. at 402.

108. Id. at 403.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

605 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
Id. at61.
Id. at64.
752 F.2d 903, 909-10 (3d Cir. 1985).
Phila.Nat'lBank, 605 F. Supp. at 63.
Id. at64.
Id.
Phila. Nat'l Bank v. Dow Chem. Co., 605 F. Supp. 60, 64 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
852 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1993).
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the 'defective product creates a situation potentially dangerous to persons or other
property, and loss occurs as a result of that danger.'"" 8 The court declined to follow
the United States Supreme Court's East River opinion because "East River
'unjustifiably dismisses the safety concerns attendant to product injuries caused by
hazardous defects""' 9 and because "any gain in certainty from a per se rule against
economic loss is bought at too high a price: decreased safety and consumer
protection."' 2 Further, the Alaska court determined that, under East River, "many
consumers'. . . not only would be denied a remedy in tort, but many also would be
deprived of a remedy in contract since a product may not be covered by a warranty
or the warranty may be limited."'' In other words, East River "fails to protect
consumers who lack equal bargaining power and who, thus, are inadequately
protected under warranty or contract law."'2 Lastly, the court noted:
[T]he intermediate approach, not the rule of East River:
"[Reflects] not only the developing direction of case law but
socially appropriate engineered philosophy directed toward better
product and a safer environment. Neither the pure East River
idiom nor its half of a loaf commercial transaction offspring as a
minority posture deserve adaptation for either consumer or
commercial purchasers in this jurisdiction. Confining recovery to
contractual remedies makes no real sense ....

Sometimes by

fortuity, other property or personal injury will not result but,
unfortunately, fortuity is not continuity and with faulty and
dangerous products, there will inevitably be injury and other
property damage in time.""

A final example of a court recognizing the exception comes from Trustees of

Columbia University v. Mitchell/GiurgolaAssociates.'24 In that case, the plaintiffs

brought an action based on "defects in the exterior 'curtain wall' of... [a] building
and the tiles attached to that wall."' 25 After a tile fell from the wall, the university
"took emergency safety measures and ordered an inspection of the building which
revealed not only that the tiles were not properly attached to the wall," but also
"that the entire wall was in imminent danger of collapse."' 26 The New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held:

118. Id. at 1175 (quoting N. Power& Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 329
(Alaska 1981)).
119. Id. at 1179 (quoting Wash. Water Power Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 774 P.2d 1199, 1209
(Wash. 1989)).
120. Id. at 1180.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173, 1180-81 (Alaska 1993) (quoting
Cont'l Ins. v. Page Eng'g Co., 783 P.2d 641, 684-85 (Wyo. 1989) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) (footnote

omitted)).
124. 492 N.Y.S.2d 371 (App. Div. 1985).
125. Id. at 373.
126. Id.
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"[P]laintiff's claim . . . set forth a viable cause of action for
property damage to its building arising from the allegedly
defective materials. . . , which materials were to be installed as
part of a building wall located on a crowded university campus
and thus constituted an unduly dangerous product for which
2 7
damages under a strict liability theory may be maintained.'
By focusing on endangered users of defective products rather than merely
disappointed users, courts have maintained a distinction between tort and contract
2
law and have also prevented contract law from drowning in "a sea of tort.'
IV. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, also recognizes the
dilemma at issue:
A somewhat more difficult question is presented when the defect
in the product renders it unreasonably dangerous, but the product
does not cause harm to persons or property. . . A plausible
argument can be made that products that are dangerous, rather
than merely ineffectual, should2 9 be governed by the rules
governing products liability law.
However, the Restatement does not support the threat of bodily injury exception to
the economic loss rule, stating "a majority of courts have concluded that the
remedies provided under the Uniform Commercial Code... are sufficient."' 30 The
majority of jurisdictions, which apply the economic loss rule in the absence of
property damage or personal injury, have relied on Chief Justice Traynor's
statement in Seely v. White Motor Co.:
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery
for physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is
not arbitrary and does not rest on the "luck" of one plaintiff in
having an accident causing physical injury. The distinction rests,
rather, on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a
manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products. He can
appropriately be held liable for physical injuries caused by defects
by requiring his goods to match a standard of safety defined in
terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm. He

127. Id. at 376.
128. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986).
129. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. d (1998).
130. Id.
131. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965). For cases relying on this language, see EastRiver, 476 U.S. at 871;
2000 Watermark Ass'n v. Celotex Corp, 784 F.2d 1183, 1186 (4th Cir. 1986); Purvis v. Consol. Energy
Prods. Co., 674 F.2d 217, 220 (4th Cir. 1982).
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cannot be held for the level of performance of his products in the
consumer's business unless he agrees that the product was
designed to meet the consumer's demands. A consumer should
not be charged at the will of the manufacturer with bearing the
risk of physical injury when he buys a product on the market. He
can, however, be fairly charged with the risk that the product will
not match his economic expectations unless the manufacturer
agrees that it will. Even in actions for negligence, a
manufacturer's liability is limited to damages for physical injuries
and there is no recovery for economic loss alone....
The law of warranty is not limited to parties in I somewhat
equal bargaining position .... The rationale of [Greenmanv. Yuba
PowerProducts, Inc. 132] ...does not rest on the analysis of the

financial strength or bargaining power of the parties to the
particular action. It rests, rather, on the proposition that "[t]he cost
of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless
one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and
distributed among the public as a cost of doing business." That
rationale in no way justifies requiring the consuming public to
pay more for their products so that a manufacturer can insure
will not meet the
against the possibility that some of his products
33
business needs of some of his customers.
A. Allocation of Risks
Allowing recovery in tort for pure economic loss where there is the threat of
bodily injury but none has yet occurred is perfectly consistent with Chief Justice
Traynor's analysis in Seely. Contract law permits parties to negotiate the allocation
of risks. However, in W.R. Grace,the Fourth Circuit determined:
[C]ontamination ...with asbestos fibers, which endanger the
lives and health of the building's occupants ...is not the type of

risk that is normally allocated between the parties to a contract by
agreement, unlike the risk of malfunctioning turbines at issue in
East River or the risk of faulty roofing shingles involved in
Watermark.'34

132. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
133. Seely, 403 P.2d at 151 (citation omitted) (quoting Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d
436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)).
134. City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975, 978 (4th Cir. 1987). The EastRiver
turbines' failure to function properly was correctly deemed a breach of warranty claim for expectancy
damages, while the blistering of shingles in Watermark "shortened the life expectancy of the roof and
destroyed its aesthetic appeal" but did not present a threat of bodily harm. Id. at 977. See E. River S.S.
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858 (1986); 2000 Watermark Ass'n v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d
1183 (4th Cir. 1986).
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In many situations, parties cannot anticipate or bargain over potential hazards at the
time of the defective products' sale. Therefore, the risk of death or serious physical
injury resulting from a product defect is not the type of risk allocated to one party
by negotiation. Presumably, if a purchaser thought a risk of injury existed, he would
not purchase the product in the first place. Consistent with the Seely language, in
the case of a threat of bodily injury, the manufacturer should be held liable in tort
because the goods failed to "match a standard of safety," not because the product
failed to meet an expected "level of performance." This reasoning is especially
persuasive in ordinary consumer transactions where there may be a greater disparity
in knowledge and bargaining power than in commercial transactions.
B. Nature of the Parties
While "[t]he economic loss rule is founded on the theory that parties to a
contract may allocate their risks by agreement and do not need the special
protections of tort law to recover for damages caused by a breach of contract,"'35
the South Carolina Supreme Court has not yet determined how the economic loss
rule specifically applies in the commercial arena.'36 However, the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina, in predicting whether South
Carolina courts would apply the economic loss rule as a bar to recovery for
negligent misrepresentation, noted that "[o]ne factor to be considered is that the
parties herein are business sophisticates and are more capable of protecting
themselves by contractual agreement than an unsophisticated consumer who is
party to a sales contract."' 37 The United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina also determined that, pursuant to the economic loss doctrine, the
Uniform Commercial Code, "provides the exclusive rights and remedies" to
sophisticated parties in a commercial transaction when "the product injures only
itself and not other property belonging to the plaintiff."' 38 Despite this
determination, the nature of the parties does not appear to be the test for whether
the economic loss rule applies when a threat of physical harm is involved. Instead,
in applying South Carolina law, the Fourth Circuit stated that "[i]t is the nature of
the risk that caused injury, rather than the nature of the parties, which is finally
determinative."' 39 Given the South Carolina Supreme Court's general dislike for the
economic loss rule, it is likely the court would agree with the Fourth Circuit on this
issue.

135. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., (TOC), Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1401, 1414 (D.S.C.
1996).
136. Kershaw County Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 302 S.C. 390, 393, 396 S.E.2d 369, 371
(1990).
137. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1549, 1557 (D.S.C. 1993).
138. Myrtle Beach Pipeline Corp. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 843 F. Supp. 1027, 1053 (D.S.C. 1993),
aff'd 46 F.3d 1125 (4th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision).
139. Purvis v. Consol. Energy Prods. Co., 674 F.2d 217, 222 (4th Cir. 1982). See, e.g., City of
Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975, 978 (4th Cir. 1987) (discussing the risks of serious
physical harm from asbestos contamination).
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C. PersonalInjury's Place in Tort Law
In his concurring opinion in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank
Co.,'" Justice Simon of the Illinois Supreme Court noted that "[h]azards peripheral
to the product's function, however, were not in the forefront of the minds of the
contracting parties, and it is convenient to have tort rules about them."'' Justice
Simon further noted that "personal injury occupies a special place in the law; risks
to the person are less subject to allocation by agreement than other risks, so that a
defect that endangers personal safety presents an unusually strong attraction to the
tort system." 142 Justice Simon believed the presence or absence of physical harm is
of no real legal significance:
The presence of any physical harm tends to indicate that more is
involved than an inferior product; the defect and the hazard were
probably such that tort treatment is appropriate. Once we decide
to treat the incident as a tort, the losses
43 are recoverable without
regard to whether they are physical.
Justice Simon's concurrence shows the fundamental question in any case is
whether the claim relates to disappointed expectations alone or to disappointed
expectations involving unreasonably dangerous conditions. When the answer is
that the claim relates to the dangerous conditions, the court should recognize an
exception to the economic loss rule for a serious threat of bodily injury.
Recognizing this exception would further the goal of deterring unsafe practices
without allowing manufacturers to contract around liabilities.
D. Legal Duties
In applying the economic loss rule in the home-buying context, the Kennedy
court explained that "a cause of action in negligence will be available where a
builder has violated a legal duty, no matter the type of resulting damage. The
'economic loss' rule will.., apply where duties are created solely by contract. In
that situation, no cause of action in negligence will lie."'" The Kennedy court
noted that "public policy further demands the imposition of a legal duty on a
builder to refrain from constructing housing that he knows or should know will

140. 435 N.E.2d 443 (II. 1982). In Moorman, the plaintiff argued that the crack in the grainstorage tank posed an "extreme threat to life and limb, and to property of plaintiff and others, a defect
which resulted in a sudden and violent ripping of plaintiffs tank, and which only fortunately did not
extend the full height of the tank." Id. at 449. The Illinois Supreme Court determined that because the
claim related to the purchaser's disappointed expectations due to product deterioration, no tort claim
was available. Id. at 450.
141. Id. at 455-56 (Simon, J., concurring).

142. Id. at 456 (citation omitted).
143. Id.
144. Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 347, 384 S.E.2d 730, 737 (1989)

(footnote omitted).
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pose serious risks of physical harm." 45 In a later case, the court determined that
"[a] breach of a duty arising independently of any contract duties between the
parties, however, may support a tort action" 1 and did not limit Kennedy to home
builders. Given the court's concern about unsafe practices in the home-building
arena and its previous extension of Kennedy to other fact patterns, the court would
probably also find that manufacturers have a legal duty to refrain from
manufacturing and selling defective products that pose serious threats of bodily
harm but do not actually cause harm.
V.

CONCLUSION

In South Carolina, the economic loss rule prevents tort liability for injury only
to the product itself unless a legal duty has been violated. Colleton correctly states
that the South Carolina Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized a threat of
bodily injury exception that would allow recovery where the product defect
threatens personal injury. However, the lack of recognition only indicates that the
court has not yet reached the question of whether a plaintiff can recover in tort in
such a situation. Language in both Kennedy and Kershaw indicates that the court
dislikes the economic loss rule that focuses on consequences. The recognition of
a right to recover for injury to the product that threatens personal injury is perfectly
consistent with the idea that a manufacturer can be held liable in tort for a failure
to match a standard of safety but cannot be held liable in tort for a non-threatening
failure of the product to meet consumer expectations. Courts recognizing the
"threat" exception have done so because the defective product caused harm to the
product and because this harm involved a grave risk of bodily harm, not just a mere
risk of harm. Decisions by the Maryland and Washington state courts show that the
risk of harm analysis provides a workable method of determining whether recovery
is allowed and determining the amount of damage. Furthermore, though restricting
product injury claims to contract theories may give manufacturers a way to limit
liabilities and reduce uncertainties regarding liability, the increase in flexibility and
certainty is too costly in terms of tort goals. To the extent that manufacturers can
successfully contract around tort liability, the goal of deterring injury from
unreasonable and unsafe conduct is frustrated. Allowing only warranty liability may
also result in unfairness because more sophisticated parties may contract around the
warranty, avoiding liability and leaving a less sophisticated, injured party with no
remedy. Furthermore, without a threat exception, recovering the costs of repairing
a defect may be impossible in cases where the statute of limitations on a warranty
claim has expired before discovery of the defect or where the product is covered
only by a limited warranty or by no warranty at all.
In light of the South Carolina cases and the policies underlying tort law, the
South Carolina Supreme Court would likely recognize a tort recovery for injury to

145. Id. at 346, 384 S.E.2d at 737.
146. Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones, & Goulding, Inc., 320 S.C. 49,
55, 463 S.E.2d 85, 88 (1995) (citing S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 289 S.C.
373, 346 S.E.2d 324 (1986)).
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the product itself if accompanied by a threat of serious bodily harm where such
threat presents a "clear, serious, and unreasonable risk of death or personal
injury." 47 Under such a scheme, the mere weakening of defective flame retardant
treated lumber without the probability of serious harm from a likely failure of a
truss would probably not support a tort claim. However, plaintiffs should probably
recover in tort where, as in Colleton, defective flame retardant treated lumber has
deteriorated to the point where roof trusses have failed or are about to fail, thereby
placing the building's inhabitants at substantial risk of serious personal injury from
an imminent roof collapse. 4 '
Matthew W. Gissendanner

147. Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 667 A.2d 624, 631-32 (Md. 1994) (4-3 decision).
148. Note some courts may still dismiss the plaintiff's negligence claim in Colleton by finding
that the defective lumber does not present a sufficient threat of bodily injury under the risk of harm
analysis articulated by the Maryland Court of Appeals and likely to be adopted by the South Carolina
Supreme Court. See supra note 91.
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